Religion and the University
Donald A Downs, The University of Wisconsin, Madison

Writers have devoted much ink to the ways in which the contemporary campus wars entail a clash between liberal and post-liberal principles in higher education. In ideal-type form, the litany of liberal principles includes free speech and academic freedom as indispensable means to the pursuit of truth; intellectual honesty and objectivity; and the essential universality of knowledge and truth. Among other things, post-liberalism denies the validity of universalism and supports restrictions on speech and academic freedom in the name of promoting sensitivity, diversity, and a sense of inclusion (“progressive censorship”).

Historically speaking, the liberal university was the product of the growing emphasis upon scientific inquiry (broadly defined) in research universities and institutions dedicated to the open-ended investigation and testing of ideas. This type of institution superseded what the American Association of University Professors has called the “proprietary university,” which is the type of university devoted to promoting a particular vision of truth. Historically, most proprietary institutions have been religious in nature. In key respects, the rise of the liberal university represented the ascendance of science over religion in the hierarchy of academic values.

Ironically, the post-liberal university embodies a new kind of proprietary institution, as it emphasizes ends extrinsic to the pursuit of truth. Indeed, some critics have observed that the drive for diversity itself has taken on a quasi-religious character on some campuses. But “diversity” seldom means intellectual diversity, as post-liberal universities are often characterized by a tiresome orthodoxy of opinion.

Meanwhile, another trend related to religion merits watching: the onset of religious liberty issues on campuses nation-wide. Cases addressing religion have emerged while many of us were preoccupied with the more typical cases involving the suppression of political ideas and speech. But religion cases could constitute the next major wave of campus liberty claims. These cases often entail restrictions on private prayer sessions (e.g., those led by resident assistants) and denial of official recognition or funding to religious groups. Unlike other campus liberty cases, which have typically pitted the liberal vision of the university against its post-liberal adversary, religion controversies pose challenges to both models of higher education.

Though the reasons for the spread of religious cases on campus are complex, three factors are most relevant for the purposes of this essay. First, religion is an important aspect of life in America, so it was probably only a matter of time before religious movements made their voices felt on campus. Second, religious groups are aware of universities’ commitments to diversity and ask why diversity should not include their voices. Third, in 1981 the Supreme Court began crafting a line of free speech jurisprudence that treated religious viewpoints on campus as another species of free speech that is subject to the full protection of the First Amendment. Therefore, religious expression is protected by the anti-viewpoint discrimination doctrine, which prohibits unequal treatment of expression based on the viewpoint of the speaker.

In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995) the Supreme Court held that a student Christian group was entitled to modest funding despite the university’s claim that such funding would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. And in Regents of the University of Wisconsin v. Southworth (2000), the Court ruled that programs distributing mandatory student fees to student groups are constitutional so long as they are distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner. Together, these two cases provided important signals to student religious groups that their inclusion on campus is backed by constitutional law, as is their right to share in the booty provided by (often mandatory) student fee systems. Today religious campus groups are asserting their rights, and such legal advocacy groups as the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and the Alliance Defense Fund are poised to assist them.

Under Southworth, such funding of students groups is constitutional if it is designed to further the educational mission of the university. Accordingly, First Amendment jurisprudence now assumes, in effect, that religious consciousness has a proper place among the intellectual values of the university -- at least in the domain of student group activity.

After Rosenberger, it is more difficult for universities to deny recognition and funding on Establishment-Clause grounds. A stronger argument for denying such benefits is that some religious groups’ membership policies violate statutory and university rules against discriminatory conduct. Two years ago, for example, the University of Southern Illinois denied official recognition to the university’s chapter of the Christian Legal Society because the CLS group excludes homosexuals from membership. CLS sued, claiming a violation of their right of freedom of association, and thus far the organization has prevailed in the courts (Christian Legal Society v. James E. Walker, et al., Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals). The University of Wisconsin is presently engaged in negotiations with the Knights of Columbus after denying the Knights' campus group funding because of the group’s exclusion of women. Other cases are active around the country. I think that the freedom of association position has the better of the argument in these cases, but the matter is not black and white.

These legal cases point to deeper issues about the role of religion in the modern university. How does religious consciousness relate to the critical reason and empiricism that is the hallmark of the liberal model of the university? In what spirit should students and faculty approach questions of faith? To what extent does context matter? Clearly academic judgments by scholars in the classroom should be governed by a different set of standards than the actions of student groups acting on their own behalf. But what limits might universities properly put on student groups’ use of university money to promote religious ends? Furthermore, what is the relationship between religious identity and the identity politics that characterizes the post-liberal university? Some observers believe that exclusion of religious groups from recognition is but another example of political correctness’s attack on tradition. But does not religious consciousness share certain attributes with other forms of identity? In other words, does the return of religion to the university represent pre-liberal, liberal, or post-liberal thinking? -- or a combination thereof?

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