

ARTICLES

Reassessing the Adversary Culture

Paul Hollander

[I]n the main the national prospect looks brighter than it has for a generation.

—Robert Bartley

That American culture is unraveling and its institutions becoming ever more fragile is so widely accepted that it doesn't require discussion.

—Robert Bork

Americans have never had more reason to be confident than we have today.

—Linda Chavez

We now live in a culture that is deeply corrupted—a liberal culture that in the name of unrestricted freedom has brought us to a condition of moral insensibility.

—Hilton Kramer

Cross national surveys taken in 1990...and in 1992...find that the overwhelming majority of Americans feel positive about their personal future, a higher proportion than in any other industrial country.

—Seymour Martin Lipset

From Harvard to Hollywood, the intellectual Left has managed to capture and corrupt most of the commanding heights of American culture.

—George Gilder

America is an astonishingly resilient society and there is good reason to be hopeful.

—Richard Neuhaus

[O]ur educational institutions...transmit relativism, deconstructionism, multiculturalism, victimization and political correctness.

—Chester Finn, Jr.¹

Is the time ripe, in the middle of the 1990s, for another reassessment of the cultural-political phenomena we call the adversary culture, (or, estrangement, alienation, multiculturalism, the radical left, or middle class radicalism²) and their product, political correctness? Are they at last in eclipse? Are past estimates and analyses of these phenomena becoming obsolete?

There is much division of opinion (as also shown above) among those who try to keep track of these matters, well-known public intellectuals, social crit-

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ics, observers of and participants in the "culture wars." A recent symposium in *Commentary* on "the national project" (addressed to questions of "balkanization," "breakdown," "dissolution of shared moral values") elicited a wide range of opinions. About one-third of the seventy-two participants were basically optimistic, another third largely pessimistic, and the rest displayed mixed attitudes and included those who "alternate between pessimism and optimism on different days of the week."³ The assessments were roughly balanced between gloom and good cheer, but virtually all commentators made reference to the same problems without attributing to them the same weight. They included family disintegration, racial polarization, crime, welfare dependence, the influence of popular (or mass) culture, the decline of educational standards, the condition of elite groups, and the more intangible cultural/moral decline, especially relativism.

The pessimistic observations are familiar enough. Besides those quoted they included "the trends towards individual irresponsibility, the evisceration of standards and... the dissolution of a common culture" (Robert Kagan) and a "penumbra of disordered, often acutely unhappy lives manifest in the prevalence of alcoholism, medicalized drug dependence, and the mass consumption of illegal narcotic" (Edward N. Luttwak). Arch Puddington correctly observed that while "we find ourselves engaged in many of the same debates and fighting many of the same battles" as in the sixties, the difference is that "those who previously pressed the anti-American case from outside the institutions of power now occupy positions of influence within the government, the universities and other institutions." In a similar vein Terry Teachout wrote that "The ruling class of the 60s has been succeeded by a new class shaped by Vietnam and racked by self-doubt. Multiculturalism... is the natural consequence of this self doubt."⁴ It is highly probable that if a similar symposium were held on the pages of *The Nation*, *The Village Voice* or other left-of-center publications, the views expressed would have been far more uniformly gloomy, though for different reasons. This writer himself has a long record of pessimistic observations regarding the same cultural/political phenomena.⁵

When I first wrote of the politicization of the campuses in these pages in 1989, it appeared that the spirit of the sixties was indisputably dominant, although the concept of political correctness (PC) was yet to be introduced.⁶ More recently I argued that in spite of the growing chorus of denial and ridicule (largely outside the campuses) PC remains a consequential and widespread phenomenon,⁷ a far cry from being an "imagined tyranny" as Brent Staples of the *New York Times* called it.⁸ In the same article I wrote of the campaign to deny or trivialize the significance and extent of PC, of the claim that PC is vastly exaggerated, its existence based on anecdotal evidence, that it is a right-wing distraction, for the most part. "Teachers for a Democratic Culture"⁹ has been spearheading the campaign against what it perceives to be a conservative resurgence on the campuses and, more specifically, the idea that PC is an

undesirable phenomenon of some importance. An entire volume was released last fall (written by an editor of the "Democratic Culture" newsletter) titled *The Myth of Political Correctness*.¹⁰ Most recently Todd Gitlin (a former 1960s radical) wrote about the "demonization" of PC.¹¹ He admits—as do others of similar persuasion—to occasional "excesses" (in the service of basically good causes) while dismissing the importance of the phenomenon as a whole. Thus, attempts to deflate the concept of PC and its reality continue, undertaken for the most part by those who have only been critical of its "excesses" rather than the values and beliefs which are its foundation.

It is true that anecdotal evidence is insufficient for proving how widespread and consequential PC has been. On the other hand one must not assume, as many writers on the subject have, that the critiques of PC outside academia signal its demise within.

The debate about the pervasiveness of PC on the campuses could be settled by ascertaining the number of schools (1) with speech codes, harassment codes, terminological codes of PC speech; (2) those that provide preferential treatment of designated groups in student admission, financial aid, and faculty recruitment; (3) those that permit self-segregation for the same groups; (4) those with freshman orientation programs redolent with themes of PC and other academic programs permeated with (or predicated on) themes of PC: black studies, women studies, cultural studies, gay studies, etc.; (5) the number of colleges with required courses in third world studies or multiculturalism; (6) the number of those requiring sensitivity or diversity training programs for staff, faculty, or campus police; and (7) ascertaining the political profile and philosophy of commencement speakers on major campuses would further contribute to a better understanding of the inroads made by the left-liberal sensibility.¹²

There are other aspects of PC or the sway of the adversarial mindset that would be far more difficult to establish, such as the number of highly qualified white males *not hired* in faculty positions, or admitted as students, (especially at elite institutions); the self-censorship exercised by people teaching in the social sciences and humanities (or their abandonment of courses likely to give rise to complaints of racism, sexism, etc.). On these matters one can indeed only rely on the plentiful anecdotal evidence.

Let me mention here a new manifestation of the institutionalization of PC in academia sweeping the country, according to the director of housing services at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. It is the proliferation of "Special Interest Residential Programs." The latter allow not only selected minority groups to indulge in residential self segregation, (a fairly well known and widespread practice), but extend the privilege to lesbians and homosexuals and some other groups who "choose to live with like minded people to create a community."¹³ People sharing the same religious beliefs are not given such opportunities (perhaps they might if supporters of the Nation of Islam

demand their own residential community), nor are those who share ethnic backgrounds other than the officially certified minorities.

In the space below I will examine not so much the persistence of PC in academia but the more intangible and probably more important matter of the climate of opinion in society at large that originally brought it into existence.

A discussion of these political trends and cultural phenomena brings two temptations. One is to insist—having invested a fair amount of time and energy in cataloging and analyzing them—that they persist unchanged. Critics of any social-cultural phenomenon have a vested interest in prolonging its existence, not merely because of their attachment to the familiar topic but also because they too need established targets of criticism to gratify their own hostilities and scapegoating impulses.¹⁴ The second temptation is to give in to wishful thinking that blends with the desire to be at one with the prevailing ethos in one's own environment, to be relieved of marginality by joining the left-liberal consensus—in this case the widely held (at least in public) view on campuses that PC and similar phenomena have been exaggerated and are undeserving of critical attention.

Admittedly there remains on my part a certain morbid fascination with the adversarial mentality and subculture and especially their core belief, that this is the most corrupt, repressive, and unjust social system history has ever known, or—another variation—that this society or country has within its power the ability to transform itself into a land of rationally distributed abundance, harmony, and social justice, but perversely refuses to do so and must therefore remain the target of relentless criticism and rejection.

It is of some importance that, although such notions have remained widespread during the last decade, several books appeared and gained varying degrees of critical acclaim and popularity by authors highly critical of the adversarial phenomena here discussed. They include Allan Bloom: *Closing of the American Mind* (1987), Richard Bernstein: *Dictatorship of Virtue* (1994), Alain Finkelkraut: *The Defeat of the Mind* (1995), Paul Gross and Norman Levitt: *Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science* (1994), William Henry, III: *In Defense of Elitism* (1994), Robert Hughes: *Culture of Complaint* (1993), Dinesh D'Souza: *Illiberal Education* (1991), Thomas Sowell: *Inside American Education* (1993), and Charles Sykes: *A Nation of Victims* (1992).

It was also during approximately the same period that the target of the adversarial worldview has spread from the U.S. to the entire Western heritage of ideas, including science. The leftist, radical feminist, Afrocentrist, and postmodernist attacks on science are a part of the broadly anti-Western thrust that has come to characterize the adversarial outlook. The animus against science has been especially strong among radical feminists.¹⁵

The anti-Western sentiments found their most potent form in multiculturalism, which essentially celebrates all cultures that are non-Western and all views of the West that are critical. Multiculturalism gains strength from its

affinity both with the chronic and pervasive American preoccupation with identity (group and individual), and with the more tangible difficulties and discontentments of ethnic groups elsewhere. As Thomas Pavel, a professor of French literature, writes: "In the postcommunist era the politics of group identity still provides the disaffected of the earth with the most congenial channel in which to express their discontent."¹⁶

There are many indications outside academia as well that much of the broader culture and its elite institutions remain hospitable to the adversarial currents, including multiculturalism. An exhibit on American science in the Smithsonian Institution "turns out to be a catalogue of environmental horrors, weapons of mass destruction and social injustice...displays of pesticide residue, air pollution, acid rain, ozone holes, radioactive waste, food additives and nuclear bombs."¹⁷ In turn, the new National History Standards for teaching American history have little to say about the accomplishments of American culture and society, omit major historical figures, but offer an overabundance of information about the historical evils and injustices associated with American society.¹⁸ And when the chances of getting a grant from the National Endowment for the Arts are greatly improved if the applicant reflects "AIDS awareness," (as was recently reported by a former special assistant to the chairman of NEA)¹⁹ once more we can say that PC has found a home in major institutions of American culture. It is also among the successes of multiculturalism that the Humanities Fellowships for 1996–97 offered by the Rockefeller Foundation require that such research be conducted almost exclusively outside Western cultural areas; most of the approved "residence [i.e., research] sites" being either non-Western study centers or those concerned with women.²⁰ Of the five books nominated for the 1995 National Book Award in fiction, two deal with Haiti and one with Puerto Rican families.²¹ Major foundations continue to lean toward PC, and liberal foundations "continue to award far more money to liberal groups than conservative foundations award to conservative groups."²²

The welcome Castro received on his October 1995 visit to New York from representatives of the churches is yet another symptom of the lingering strength of the attitudes here sketched. This vocal foreign detractor of the United States (and self-styled radical socialist) still inspires warmth in the bosoms of the social critics.²³ Sandra Levinson, an editor of the adulatory volume *Venceremos Brigade* (1971), is not only the executive director of the Center for Cuban Studies (associated with the City College system of New York) but continues, unembarrassed, to defend Castro's system in the *New York Times*.²⁴ She is but one of the uncounted number of tenured radicals in our institutions of higher learning.

There are many good reasons for the tenaciousness of PC and the beliefs and policies associated with it. PC is victim-driven, much of it consisting of attitudes and policies that are supposed to benefit the designated victim groups. While these policies were designed to erase victimhood, the victims feel com-

pelled to continue asserting their victimhood; otherwise, their claims to special treatment (moral and material) would cease to have legitimacy. In this way many idealistic, social-justice-seeking impulses have become transformed into old-fashioned interest-group politics, groups fighting for spoils. In the words of Robert Bork, we are stuck in a situation in which "individuals who have never been discriminated against are preferred to individuals who have never discriminated, regardless of their respective achievements."²⁵

The constituency with a vital interest in preserving the gains associated with left-liberal policies includes all those spreading or maintaining the values, beliefs, and rules associated with PC and the adversarial outlook. Their numbers include many, if not all those who teach black studies, women's studies, cultural studies, critical legal studies or gay studies, and those ranks are further swollen by assorted deans and subdeans, affirmative action officers, and other administrators who devise and enforce harassment and speech codes. All of them have a truly vested interest in these policies—without them they would not have their jobs. At the same time they also tend to believe in these policies and the principles underlying them: careerism and idealism form a package difficult to pry apart.

The notion of "diversity" (poorly defined as it is) offers new justifications for preferential treatment on the ground of vague (educational, cultural, psychological, emotional) benefits and in connection with yet another dubious idea, that of role models. The latter promises that an automatic enrichment process will occur as soon as there is an adequate statistical representation of, say, native Americans in departments of geology or blacks in astronomy. The same goes for admitting students representative of the current notions of diversity notwithstanding the fact that the same institutions that preach the blessings of diversity eagerly support every effort at self-segregation of the designated minorities once they arrive on campus.

The persistence of PC is closely linked to a durable white guilt since much of PC has to do with, or originates in, race relations. It bears repetition that much of PC originated in idealistic impulses, in solicitousness toward the underdog, the victim. These sentiments are congenial to American cultural values and traditions.

But the attachment to victimhood also feeds on the more diffuse adversarial, radical social-critical impulses that find vindication in the existence of victim groups, and the more the better. New groups of victims continue to be found at a time when one would have thought that all varieties of victimhood have by now been discovered and claimed. "Middle agism" is new and likely to be a popular category: "Age discrimination at midlife... [which] affects more groups and classes than anyone has imagined... viciously curtails the American dream and embitters our image of the life course. It is an urgent issue."²⁶ An endless vista of victims stretches over the horizon of American society and provides vindication for the radical social critics. It will not be easy to let go of them.

Last but not least, preferentially treated victim groups have a vested interest in prolonging their own status, not merely for material-economic reasons, but, just as important, because of the moral high ground they have been invited to occupy and the solicitousness that goes with it. Victimhood, when widely recognized and given the legal stamp of approval, confers a sense of moral distinction and invites sympathy and compassion; Judeo-Christian religious themes also support the notion that suffering ennobles in some ways, that it somehow deepens our humanity.

The attitudes associated with PC and the adversary culture are further nourished by a selective social determinism: racists, sexists, capitalists, rednecks, homophobes, etc., freely chose their detestable beliefs and ways and hence can be held fully responsible. The chosen victims, by contrast, are helpless products of social history or circumstance, as for example violent criminals who belong to the minorities of the inner city, or selected public heroes of the adversary culture. (It was written of the famous Robert Mapplethorpe by his biographer that he was "predatory, exploitative, self destructive and destructive of others" and that he tortured animals at an early age.) A reviewer of this biography explained: "Could it be that 2 year old Robert was angry? Could it be that in torturing a little animal (turtles) he was reflecting his own feelings of being tortured by family members? What about his father's rigidity, eating disorder and strict Catholicism? What about his older brother's masculinity? What about the smothering mother who confessed that Robert was her favorite child?"²⁷ O.J. Simpson also turns out to be a victim in the eyes of those who share the color of his skin, notwithstanding his wealth, celebrity status, and well established credentials as a wife beater and his highly probable guilt in the double murders. Reportedly, even battered black women cheered the news of his acquittal.

Although such examples could be multiplied at great length, I am not suggesting that *nothing* has changed over the last decade and especially over the last two years. Since the early 1980s counter trends have appeared, as shown in the election and reelection of Reagan and most recently in the election of a Republican Congress. At the same time, and curiously enough, under the Reagan administration the cultural influences and impact of middle class radicalism (or the adversarial outlook) have not been rolled back, or even seriously contested. In fact, PC emerged and swept the country during the 1980s but only its most extreme or lurid manifestations gained belated negative publicity; much of PC has been unquestioned and unknown to the general public and unchallenged on the campuses until the last couple of years.

At the same time there has been a growing recognition among academics and other professionals that the imposition of PC (especially through speech and harassment codes) exacts a high price in academic freedom and free expression.²⁸ Thus, at the present time contradictory phenomena proliferate. While numerous court rulings struck down speech codes, most schools still cling to them and some are anxious to develop new, more comprehensive ones.²⁹

It is possible at the present time to locate indicators and arguments both for the view that the adversarial attitudes and policies remain vigorous *and* that they are withering. At my own campus, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (regarded by many outsiders as a flagship of left-radicalism and PC, though I think that it is about average for a big Eastern university), the *Daily Collegian* reported a vote by the undergraduate senate “*against* a proposal to make SAT ... [tests] optional in the undergraduate admissions process.” Those wishing to do away with them argued that they are “biased against students of color...low income students and women.”³⁰ The same student paper allocated almost a full page to the bitter denunciation of Yitzhak Rabin by a radical third world student following his assassination.³¹

Among the recent changes in the climate of opinion it is important to note that, as of the last two years or so, it has become possible to engage in public criticism of “affirmative action” (a centerpiece of political correctness) even in the pages of the *New York Times* and on the evening network news. Politicians and journalists are no longer terrified (academics still are) of questioning these policies. Meanwhile Supreme Court rulings made a small dent in some race- and sex-based preferences. The University of California trustees voted in 1995 to phase out these policies, but it remains unclear when and how their decision will be implemented, whether or not the trustees’ determination will survive the first sit-ins, trashing and occupation of academic or other public buildings, and other likely expressions of displeasure with the new policies.

Whatever the actual quality of the beliefs in PC, and especially affirmative action, the *policies and institutions dispensing it remain in place*, entrenched and institutionalized. There are tens of thousands of people who make their living from legitimating, administering, and maintaining the current levels of PC, including “diversity and sensitivity trainers” and other dubious experts on intergroup relations.³²

At the same time, whatever their degree of institutionalization, the beliefs and values that have animated the adversary culture and PC have become stale, partly by the sheer force of repetition. How many more times can individuals, groups, or institutions be accused ritualistically of racism, institutional racism, sexism, homophobia, patriarchal attitudes, and so forth? It is likely that these beliefs are held today with less conviction and probably by fewer people. As Andrew Sullivan of *The New Republic* put it

As an ideology affirmative action in 1995 is beginning to resemble Soviet Communism in 1989. Outside the sheltered elites, the majority of people loathe it. The circumstances in which it was dreamed up no longer exist. It is clearly teetering, its legitimacy under mortal threat.³³

There has also been some disenchantment on the part of the older Left with identity politics and multiculturalism, viewing them as frivolous distract-

tions from the real problems and conflicts of American society, especially economic inequalities and latent class conflicts.

The key issue in the survival of the adversary culture (or middle class radicalism) is whether or not and to what degree its adherents succeed in its transmission to the younger generations.³⁴ There is little doubt that the major figures of this culture belong to an older generation, that those with the strongest commitment to adversarial values, the most embittered, strident, and widely known critics of American society and Western culture are the generation of the 1960s, old, aging, or middle-aged. There is thus a real possibility that the attitudes and beliefs here discussed will wither as a result of generational change.

William Kunstler recently passed away, although younger successors claim his mantle and he remains revered by many.³⁵ At the memorial gathering "the scene was akin to a reunion of some long-ago class. Mostly gray-haired and stoop-shouldered, their ranks thinned by the years, the alumni of the radical left of a generation ago greeted and embraced each other."³⁶ The prominent (or once prominent) and now aging social critics and former activists (who are, for the most part, between the ages of sixty and seventy) include the Berrigan brothers, Noam Chomsky,³⁷ Johnetta Cole, Harvey Cox, Angela Davis, David Dellinger (he is around eighty), E.L. Doctorow, Andrea Dworkin, Barbara Ehrenreich, Stanley Fish, Fredric Jameson, Jonathan Kozol, Norman Mailer, Ralph Nader, Francis Fox Piven, Adrienne Rich, Theodore Roszak, Gore Vidal, and Howard Zinn—to mention a few. Susan Sontag apparently retired from politics. Tom Hayden too is aging and a long way from his fiery days in the SDS. Among the aging and the aged, critics Richard Barnet, Richard Falk, H. Bruce Franklin, Saul Landau, Staughton Lynd, Michael Parenti, Marcuse Raskin, and William Sloan Coffin Jr. are increasingly unfamiliar names. The Institute for Policy Studies (for long the think tank of the radical Left) is not much in the news. It is difficult to come up with any prominent radical social critic under 50; Oliver Stone the moviemaker may be one. In addition, some of the better-known social critics of the past toned down their critiques or changed their attitude altogether, among them Paul Berman, Eugene Genovese, Richard Rorty, and Alan Wolfe.

In the wake of the November 1994 elections (which resulted in the Republican Congress) we are at a paradoxical juncture. I think that the heyday of PC and the adversary culture is over; it may well fade away when the generation of the sixties passes from the scene. On the other hand and paradoxically, the new Congress may in some ways contribute to the persistence of the policies and attitudes associated with PC and the adversary culture: people like to feel besieged, to wage an uphill battle claiming to overcome great odds. Those in the frontline who spread or administer PC may now feel that they are beleaguered fighters for social justice, an endangered heroic vanguard (or rearguard), a saving remnant destined to preserve idealistic policies. It may be noted here that spokesmen and publications of the Left have been complaining ever since

the early 1970s of their own disarray and fragmentation; they also speak of a lack of impact. Fragmentation is one thing, however, and lack of impact another. Even with the perceived collapse and splintering of the New Left of the sixties, most of its values have been taken up by impassioned single-issue groups: radical feminists, black extremists (secular or religious), radical environmentalists, activist homosexuals, multiculturalists, postmodernist academics, and others.

Radical feminism remains, of course, another important source of support for PC and a component of the adversary culture, though in this area too there have been some changes. Just as it has become possible to raise questions in public about preferential treatment, it has become at least semi-legitimate to suggest that there are some differences between men and women that are not "culturally constructed." A group of articulate and courageous women has emerged willing to question the verities of radical feminism, which until recently remained unchallenged, especially on the campuses.³⁸

While there is room for cautious optimism, it would be unreasonable to believe—for the many reasons noted above—that the left-liberal ethos in our cultural institutions will rapidly and dramatically vanish. There are, nonetheless, some concluding observations that may point in a more optimistic direction. One is that American culture and society has a limited attention span and a great thirst for novelty; much of PC has been with us far too long to attract sympathetic attention and enthusiastic support. The second point has a more indirect bearing on the subject. I was one among many observers and students of communist systems, especially that of the Soviet Union, who found it difficult to foresee how and when they would vanish; I used to believe that they would remain with us in the foreseeable future. I was of course wrong and very pleased that I was. By the same token I hope to be proven wrong about the persistence of PC—it may collapse sooner than we expect; the final withering away of the adversarial ethos may be closer than one might guess due to circumstances we cannot fully grasp at the present time.

It is possible that we have entered the stage of cultural *glasnost* in American society. The public questioning of the left-liberal articles of faith and the academic status quo under way is likely *slowly* to undermine the already shaky legitimacy of these phenomena—there is, after all, a link between the public expression of critical ideas and social change.

Notes

1. "The National Prospect—A Symposium," *Commentary* (November 1995): 27, 32, 43, 71–72, 78, 61, 89, 52.
2. "Middle class radicalism," an excellent concept, was introduced by the English sociologist Frank Parkin. It never caught on, at least in America. See his *Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Basis of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1968).
3. Diane Ravitch, *Commentary* (November 1995): 103.

4. *Commentary* (November 1995): 32, 47, 52, 60–61, 68, 71, 72, 79, 101, 109.
5. See Paul Hollander, *Survival of the Adversary Culture* (1988), *Decline and Discontent* (1992), and *Anti-Americanism* (1992, 1995).
6. Paul Hollander, "From Iconoclasm to New Conventional Wisdom: The Sixties in the Eighties," *Academic Questions* (Fall 1989).
7. "‘Imagined Tyranny?’ Political Correctness Reconsidered," *Academic Questions* (Fall 1994). For a systematic refutation of the major claims of political correctness see Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, *Political Correctness: A Critique* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Essays, Hoover Institution, 1995).
8. Brent Staples, "Time to Retire a Cliché—‘Politically Correct’—Shopworn and Blinding," *New York Times*, 5 December 1993, Editorial Notebook, sec. 4, 20.
9. The designation of this group is reminiscent of terms such as "peoples' democracy" "popular front," or "national liberation movements." I am not suggesting that—like the terms noted above—"democratic culture" was communist inspired but that it too has a misleading component, the alleged commitment to the highly imprecise idea of "democratic culture" intended to appeal to the uncommitted. It would of course have been far more accurate for the organization to call itself "teachers for a left-liberal or left-of-center culture."
10. John K. Wilson, *The Myth of Political Correctness: The Conservative Attack on Higher Education* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995).
11. Todd Gitlin, "Demonizing Political Correctness," *Dissent* (Fall 1995).
12. At least one impressionistic survey shows the predominance of left-of-center speakers, many of them Hollywood and media celebrities. See "Lefüsts Dominate Commencement Exercises," *Libertas* (Summer 1995), 4.
13. L. Loisel, "Like-minded students find place at UMass: Housing includes gay, minority, wellness floor," *Daily Hampshire Gazette* (Northampton, Mass.), 26 September 1995.
14. Dennis Wrong once wrote that "...keeping constant tabs on the errors and irrationalities of the left is sweaty, unrewarding work that Hollander for the most part performs with intelligence and insight. But I am not entirely certain...that he overcomes the temptation to magnify the importance of the subject in order to justify his labors." He argued that these labors persisted far beyond the time when the phenomenon deserved sustained attention, *Contemporary Sociology* (September 1989): 724.
15. Radical feminists proposed, among other things, that "the laws of physics were constructed to maintain white male dominance." Robert L. Park, "The Danger of Voodoo Science," *New York Times*, op-ed, 9 July 1995.
16. Thomas Pavel, "The Global Malady," a review of A. Finkelkraut's *The Defeat of the Mind*, in *Commentary* (November 1995): 134.
17. Park, "Voodoo Science."
18. See "Special Issue: A Critique of the National History Standards," *Continuity*, 19 (Spring 1995); also Lynne Cheney, "The National History (Sub) Standards," *Wall Street Journal*, 23 October 1995.
19. Lynne Munson, "Art by Committee," op-ed, *New York Times*, 21 September 1995.
20. Humanities Fellowship flier for 1996–97.
21. *Daily Hampshire Gazette*, 16 November 1995, 8.
22. See for example David Samuels, "Philanthropical Correctness," *The New Republic* (18 and 25 September 1995); Robert Lerner and Althea Nagai, "Foundation Leaders," *Alternatives in Philanthropy*, a publication of the Capital Research Center, Washington, DC (February 1995): 1. See also Althea Nagai, Robert Lerner, and Stanley Rothman, *The Culture of Philanthropy: Foundations and Public Policy* (Washington: Capital Research Center, 1991).
23. One hundred religious leaders flocked to the UN mission of Cuba to meet him. It was an "overwhelmingly protestant group" that included national and local clergy. See Lizette Alvarez, "Culiani? He Wouldn't Get Castro's Vote," *New York Times*, 26 October 1995.
The adversarial attitudes of the clergy were discussed at some length in chapter two: "The Churches: New Voices of Social Protest," in Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1995).

24. Sandra Levinson, letter, *New York Times*, 9 November 1995, A28.
25. Robert Bork: "Hard Truths About the Culture War," *First Things* (June/July 1995): 21.
26. Margaret Morganroth Gulette, "Middle-Agism in the Postmodern Economy," *Dissent* (Fall 1995): 508.
27. Quoted in Garry Wills, "Robert Mapplethorpe as Victim," *Washington Times*, 17 June 1995.
28. For a recent example of an outburst of faculty protest against such (proposed) codes, see the letters in *Campus Chronicle* (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), 10 November 1995. See also, Harvey Silverglate, "Harvard Law Caves in to the Censors," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 January 1996.
29. At UMass, Amherst, my own school, in the fall of 1995 it was proposed that a new comprehensive harassment code be created to include new groups (or categories of offense) based on "citizenship, culture, HIV status, language, parental status, political affiliation or belief and pregnancy status"; the new code also sought to punish those who *invite* speakers who offend those in some of these groups; it proposed as standard of proof the concurrence of a member of the group allegedly offended. (Memorandum circulated at UMass, Amherst, dated 20 September 1995).
30. *Massachusetts Daily Collegian* (Amherst), 16 October 1995, 4, emphasis added.
31. Hussein Ibish, "The Life and Crimes of General Yitzhak Rabin," *Massachusetts Daily Collegian*, 10 November 1995.
32. The 12 November 1995 Sunday *New York Times* carried a special supplement titled "The Diversity Challenge" and proclaimed, no doubt correctly, that "diversity coordinator [is] a new career."
33. Andrew Sullivan, "Let Affirmative Action Die," op-ed, *New York Times*, 23 July 1995.
34. In my *Anti-Americanism* (1992, 1995) there is contradictory evidence. The students (undergraduates) surveyed in the mid and late 1980s displayed both what might be called highly patriotic attitudes and those which reflected the impact of prolonged exposure to adversarial ideas. See chapter 6, "The Worldview of College Students," 307-29.
35. See Don Terry, "Chicago Journal: Celebrating William Kunstler's Life and Causes," *New York Times*, 6 November 1995.
36. Richard Perez-Pena, "1000 Honor Kunstler, Defender of Their Faith," *New York Times*, 20 November 1995.
37. Chomsky remains deeply attached to his apocalyptic views of a conspiracy of American corporations and their henchmen to dominate the world. He depicts this plot in a recent book, *World Orders, Old and New* (1994). For a critique of a not entirely unsympathetic reviewer see Richard Wolin, "Noam on the Range," *Dissent* (Summer 1995). Similar beliefs are also firmly held—more in regard to matters domestic than foreign—by Jonathan Kozol. See for example Peter Applebome, "Listening to the South Bronx," *New York Times*, 25 October 1995. Quite possibly Kozol's immense bitterness is also nourished by the feeling he confessed to in the article cited, namely "an enormous sense of having failed in life...I feel, in the end, as if everything I've done has been a failure."
38. See for example Daphne Patai and Noretta Koertge, *Professing Feminism, Cautionary Tales from the Strange World of Women's Studies* (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Christina Hoff Sommers, *Who Stole Feminism: How Women Have Betrayed Women* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); Katie Roiphe, *The Morning After: Sex, Fear and Feminism on Campus* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993); and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, *Feminism without Illusions* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).