Why Scientists Need to Study the Philosophy of Science

Oct 30, 2017 |  Edward R. Dougherty

Font Size  


Why Scientists Need to Study the Philosophy of Science

Oct 30, 2017 | 

Edward R. Dougherty

The National Association of Scholars will focus more of its attention in the next several years to the modern crises of science—the linked crises of reproducibility, misuse of statistics, sloppy research procedures, and frequently politicized groupthink. We will publish a series of reports dealing with aspects of these crises, as well as shorter pieces by distinguished scientists. We are delighted to inaugurate this series with Edward R. Dougherty’s summary of the epistemological roots of the modern crisis of science—and the ever-sharper imperative for working scientists to apprehend the philosophy of science, as a prerequisite to their scientific practice.

Edward R. Dougherty is Robert M. Kennedy '26 Chair and Distinguished Professor of the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, and Scientific Director of the Center for Bioinformatics and Genomic Systems Engineering, at Texas A&M University. His publications include Epistemology of the Cell: A Systems Perspective on Biological Knowledge (co-author Michael L. Bittner, 2011) and The Evolution of Scientific Knowledge: From Certainty to Uncertainty (2016).

Mention philosophy of science and many people, including scientists, will think that you are referring to arcane reflections unrelated to the pragmatic business of the world. This is especially so if you mention “epistemology,” the theory of knowledge. But they could hardly be more mistaken. Scientific epistemology has developed over the centuries to characterize what we mean by the knowledge of empirical events. A scientist aims to gain knowledge. To achieve this aim, the quest must be guided by an appreciation of that which he wishes to pursue. Quoting Albert Einstein, “Science without epistemology is – insofar as it is thinkable at all – primitive and muddled.”

Most people have the commonsense Aristotelian notion that one has empirical knowledge if an idea in the mind possesses concordance with the thing outside the mind to which the idea pertains. This view presupposes that one knows the meaning of the words “idea”, “thing”, and “concordance.” Epistemology gives meaning to these terms and in doing so shapes our thinking about phenomena.

With Isaac Newton, science became essentially what it is today: the “idea” in the mind is a mathematical system constituting the knowledge, the “thing” is a measurement, and “concordance” is a relation between the mathematical system and the measurement that facilitates testing the theory. It took three centuries, from Newton’s Principia through the development of quantum theory, to gain a deep appreciation of these terms and to recognize the subtleties. Only by serious contemplation on the evolution of scientific thinking through the centuries can one truly appreciate these subtleties.

Especially troublesome is the elusive character of scientific “truth.” The “truth” of a theory somehow lies in its concordance with Nature. But we don’t observe Nature directly; rather, we observe phenomena, not the underlying thing-in-itself. More perplexing still, not only is Nature perceived through the filter of our senses, the perceptions themselves and the ideas to which they lead depend on the structure of mind, on what Immanuel Kant called “categories of the understanding.” Our minds impose structure on ideas as a prerequisite for ideas to be thought.

Understanding is limited to our mental categories but science is not limited to them. Consider causality, one of Kant’s categories. Whereas Aristotle had regarded the determination of cause as basic for scientific knowledge, Newton (following Galileo) rejected causality as part of science. For Newton, mathematics constitutes scientific knowledge and that knowledge is not subservient to human understanding. Thus, his famous phrase: “Hypotheses non fingo.” (“I frame no hypotheses.”)  

With quantum theory in the early part of the Twentieth Century, the full implication of Hypotheses non fingo is realized. Whereas classical terms such as “particle,” “wave,” and “force” had their origins in pre-scientific perceptual experience, with quantum mechanics the observations do not fit into everyday understanding.

There is the mathematical theory, the relations between the mathematics and the observations, and the experiments that test predictions of future events deduced from the theory. Nature may not be understandable, but mathematics can provide predictions. Mathematics is understandable because it is a product of human intellect, but it may not describe the phenomena in a manner compatible with pre-scientific physical intuition. Does light consist of particles or waves? Take your choice. It really doesn’t matter. The theory allows you to predict future behavior. Scientific knowledge is functional.

Owing to its mathematical form, science goes beyond understanding, but at a price: a theory’s validation lies outside of pure reason in the domain of prediction, whose analysis requires difficult statistical theory. Naïve concepts of objectivity and subjectivity must be discarded. A theory is accepted or rejected, always provisionally, on the basis of whether or not observations are sufficiently close to predictions derived from the theory.  Sufficiency is based on statistical criteria. There is some range of measurements within which a theory is accepted. Two scientists may disagree on the acceptance region. Thus, one might accept a theory while the other rejects it. Science is inter-subjective: all can agree on the mathematical formulation of a theory and understand the criteria of acceptance, but they need not agree on the criteria. 

There is significant subtlety in scientific epistemology and one might ask, Can’t I just apply the concepts of model and validation and get on with my work? Perhaps, if you can do the mathematical modeling, rigorously relate the model to measurements, and perform the necessary experiments. However, none of this is straightforward, especially when dealing with complex systems, such as in biology, where there are tens of thousands of potential variables in a single cell and it is experimentally unfeasible to test more than a few basic predictions, if that.

We meet the crisis of the Twenty-first Century: the human desire to study complex systems for which the measurement processes themselves are intricate and often very noisy. The requirements of science may not only be extraordinarily difficult to meet, they may be impossible to meet unless focus is extremely narrowed, perhaps so much that the resulting theory is so crude that accurate predictions cannot be made. We are confronted by the impossibility of scientific knowledge regarding aspects of Nature vital to human well-being.

It is mandatory that the epistemological issues related to this conundrum be studied by those hoping to gain scientific knowledge regarding high-dimensional systems, such as the human cell, or systems whose behavior must be modeled across large time scales, such as climate. Science faces an epistemological crisis greater than the one engendered by quantum mechanics. Those issues were resolved within the basic Newtonian epistemology, whereas it does not appear that contemporary scientists will be so fortunate when it comes to their epistemological quandary. Those who wish to pursue fundamental knowledge must profoundly comprehend the path that has got us where we are and prepare for the long, steep road ahead.

Image: Scientist by luvqs/ CC0 Creative Commons

Robert W Tucker

| November 15, 2017 - 4:23 PM

Robert W Tucker
I devoted a good portion of my early career studying both the historical progression and the current state of the presuppositions, canons of reasoning, conventions, and trends in methodology and interpretation in play when we are engaged in forms of inquiry we think of as scientific. I say “forms” because science is much more a family resemblance construct than a unified set of canons, etc. that apply across all forms of inquiry. During those years, I examined both the epistemological dimensions and the nature and structure of the actual decisions we make when we are said to be doing science. The latter is not a pretty picture but does show clearly that our logical reconstruction of what it means to do science is, and must be, at variance with how we actually do science. 

Even with this background, it is not a good thing when I see today that the majority (yes) of the scientific investigations in many disciplines contain conceptual, methodological, analytic, and/or interpretative flaws sufficient to dismiss their findings outright or, more commonly, to wait for the replications or refined follow up studies that are rarely conducted and, if conducted, are rarely published.

In my view, the current weaknesses in scientific practice rest largely the fact that scientific communities have been infected with psychologically and economically perverse incentives. Based on its treatment of climate science, however, I worry that NAS will focus less on these perversities and more on whatever liberal ideologies is manages to gin up. I hope that this concern is disproven by the facts. Helping those who would be scholars understand the philosophy and practice of science is an important endeavor and one appropriate to the NAS. I look forward to what NAS has to say about this topic. I hope that its work will focus on good science and not on promoting a politically conservative agenda.

Stephen Grossman

| November 19, 2017 - 1:08 PM

> we don’t observe Nature directly; rather, we observe phenomena, not the underlying thing-in-itself.

Existence is not split. Existence is existence everywhere. Your hidden anti-scientific mysticism is the cause of the crisis in science. See Aristotle, Ayn Rand and David Harriman for rational alternative.